CONFRONTING TRANSATLANTIC DISCORD

Major Policy Differences between the United States and Europe

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This analysis of major transatlantic policy differences is divided into six parts. Part I attempts to set forth the case against Saddam Hussein and his regime as viewed from the perspective of the Bush Administration. Part II discusses the evolution of the current U.S. national security strategy. Part III analyzes the so-called "power gap" between the U.S. and Europe. Part IV focuses on the transatlantic alliance; and Part V is concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The last part concludes the analysis.

I. The U.S. Case Against Iraq

The United States Congress passed the Iraq Liberation Act, by an overwhelming bipartisan vote, which President Clinton signed into law on October 31, 1998. According to this law, "It should be the policy of the United States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq and to promote the emergence of a democratic government to replace that regime." It was stipulated that nothing in this law "shall be construed to authorize…the use of United States Armed Forces…in carrying out this Act." Four years later, however, President George W. Bush on October 16, 2002 signed a joint resolution of Congress authorizing him "to use the Armed Forces of the United States as he determines to be necessary and appropriate in order to (1) defend the national security of the United States against the continuing threat posed by Iraq; and (2) enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council Resolutions regarding Iraq."

On March 19, 2003, the U.S. under President George W. Bush launched its long-threatened war against Iraq, to free the Iraqi people from decades of oppression and tyranny by Saddam Hussein, to force a regime change, to destroy his weapons of mass destruction, to end his threat to U.S. national security, and to establish a democratic government responsive to the Iraqi people.

Among United States justifications for its use of force was that it was legally enforcing United Nations resolutions. The U.S. pointed to the allegation that Saddam flouted 16 U.N. resolutions over 12 years that warned him to disarm, including the Security Council's unanimously-adopted Resolution 1441 of November 2002 that gave Saddam a "final opportunity" to do so "fully and immediately "or face "serious

consequences." The U.S. claimed, moreover, that Iraq was a "rogue" state that harbored terrorists linked to Al Qaeda.

The U.S. also pointed to the vast number of crimes the Iraqi government under Saddam committed against the Iraqi people and others, particularly the Kurds in the north and the Shia population in the south. Human Rights Watch, which monitors such crimes worldwide, asserted that two decades of oppression against Iraq's Kurdish civilians, culminating in 1988 with a genocidal campaign and the use of chemical weapons, caused over 100,000 deaths. Moreover, tens of thousands of Marsh Arabs in the south, who were Shia Muslims, were forced to flee to Iran after the 1991 Gulf War. Human Rights Watch also claimed that torture techniques killed thousands of Iraqi political detainees, and included burning suspects alive, hangings, rape, and beatings. And "disappearances" were believed to have ranged between 250,000 to 290,000. Furthermore, the Iraqi military used chemical weapons in its war against Iran, killing some twenty thousand Iranians, and committing serious human rights violations during its occupation of Kuwait.**1**

As now well known, regardless of its compelling case against Iraq and its reach for high moral ground, most major world powers--including France, Germany, Russia and China--and the vast majority of people polled throughout the world, firmly opposed the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq. As the war neared, most Americans supported the war, whereas about 80 percent of those polled in France, Germany, Russia and Turkey opposed it.**2** And regardless of U.S. claims that its "coalition of the willing" comprised 47 nations (prominently including the "anglo-sphere" of the U.S., the United Kingdom, and Australia), widespread opposition to the war escalated from mere differences among the nations of the world to a threatened rupture of well-established mainstays of the global order--the United Nations, the Western Alliance, NATO, and the European Union. Indeed, it would seem that the threatened rupture goes far beyond Iraq to global mistrust, resentment, and opposition of the policies and power of the United States as embedded in its National Security Strategy.

II. Evolution of The U.S. "National Security Strategy"

The question may be asked: what really drove the Bush administration's desire to wage a war against Iraq? A plausible answer requires a look backward in time to understand the formulation and the authors of a plan that led to that war. We must go back in time not only before September 11, 2001 and the "war on terrorism," but also before George W. Bush was elected President of the United States in the year 2000. We must go all the way back to at least the spring of 1992, when George H. W. Bush was President. It was then, after the Gulf War of 1991, that two defense department staff members, Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis Libby, prepared a draft Defense Policy Guideline (DPG) for their boss, Dick Cheney, who was at that time U.S. Defense Secretary.   The DPG document acknowledged that--with the demise of the Soviet Union--the U.S. became the world's only superpower. It called for U.S. domination of much of the world by the unilateral use of military power, and by preempting nations that might have weapons of mass destruction.

Then in June1997, a neo-conservative think tank—named the Project for the New American Century (PNAC)—was established to support American dominance in the world.   According to its website, "the Project for the New American Century is a non-profit educational organization whose goal is to promote American global leadership."

The PNAC's "statement of principles" urged a significant increase in military spending and, with respect to preemptive military action, the statement added that "it is important to shape circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before they become dire." Twenty-five persons signed this statement, including: Dick Cheney (later to become head of the transition team of President-elect George W. Bush and is now Vice President of the United States), Donald Rumsfeld (now Secretary of Defense), Paul Wolfowitz (now Deputy Secretary of Defense), I. Lewis Libby (now Dick Cheney's chief of staff), Elliott Abrams (now Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director on the National Security Council for Southwest Asia, Near East and North African Affairs), and Jeb Bush (President George W. Bush's brother and now Governor of Florida).**3**   Eight of the signers, including Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, while then in the private sector, wrote President Bill Clinton in January 1998 urging him to use military

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force against Iraq and remove Saddam Hussein and his regime from power to eliminate Iraq's possibility of using weapons of mass destruction.**4** In September 1998, Wolfowitz told a committee of Congress that such an undertaking will not work "if we insist on maintaining the unity of the UN Security Council."**5**

The conclusion appears inescapable, therefore, that the U.S.-led war against Iraq was not a reaction by the American government to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, but a continuation of a plan that was initiated and formulated over the previous decade by prominent leaders of the current administration. The terrorist attacks, however, provided the trigger or opening for bringing the plan to the surface.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, European leaders had strongly declared their solidarity with the United States and its launching, within a month of the attacks, of a major war on the other side of the world in Afghanistan to rid that country of Taliban rule. Indeed, some of its European allies wanted to send more troops than the United States was willing to accept. Thereafter, however, relations between the United States and its European allies steeply declined, principally because of European apprehension of national security policies of the United States. These policies, made known by speeches of President George W. Bush after the September 11 attacks, provoked much global distress especially among Europeans.

In his first major speech after September 11, President Bush declared on September 14 that "the enemy is terrorism," that the United States "makes no distinction between terrorists and those who knowingly harbor or provide aid to them," and that the United States would not hesitate to act "preemptively" to prevent terrorists from harming the United States. This was his first public declaration of a possible doctrine of preemptive war.**6**

In early November, President Bush declared that "a coalition partner must do more than just express sympathy, a coalition partner must perform." He cautioned: "all nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something," and "they will be held accountable for inactivity." He added: "you're either with us or against us in the fight against terror."**7** Although President Bush did not name any nations, his "with us or against us" approach was widely interpreted to apply to European allies of the United States.**8**

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In his January 2002 State of the Union Address, President Bush announced that North Korea, Iran and Iraq were "regimes that sponsor terrorism" and constituted "an axis of evil," and that the goal of the United States is to prevent them from threatening America or its allies with weapons of mass destruction.**9** President Bush elaborated his preemptive doctrine in his June 1, 2002 speech. "Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists," President Bush said, "the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture…. We cannot let our enemies strike first." The United States must be willing to take "anticipatory action" and will, if necessary, "act preemptively."**10** In September 2002, the White House released a document known as "The National Security Strategy of the United States," consisting of the compilation of these and other relevant speeches by President Bush.**11**

By the end of October 2002, it became unambiguously clear to the rest of the world that the United States intended to wage war against Iraq with or without its allies. Regardless of the U.N. Security Council's unanimous warning to Iraq to disarm, embodied in Resolution 1441 of November 2002, followed by the appearance of progress toward that end by U.N. weapons inspectors, the U.S. and U.K. ultimately failed to persuade the three other permanent Security Council members (France, Russia and China) to support another resolution sanctioning force against Iraq, thus marking the end to diplomacy.**12**

The war against Iraq was completely consistent with the Bush doctrine of preemptive warfare. Whereas Presidential declarations on foreign policy traditionally had been framed by the State Department, the Bush first-strike doctrine as--we have noted--has its roots in the Defense Department. It evoked much apprehension throughout the world, because it appeared to many as justifying possible serial or sequential invasions contrary to international law.

The Bush doctrine became more alive than ever once the war against Iraq had ended. The question was whether this doctrine would be taken to what is arguably the next logical step: stopping other countries that pose a threat to proliferation. This question appeared to have been answered even before the American war machine had secured Baghdad. On April 9, 2003, John R. Bolton, U.S. undersecretary of state, warned those countries that the U.S. had accused of pursuing weapons of mass destruction,

including Iran, Syria and North Korea, to "draw the appropriate lesson from Iraq." The very next day when Saddam's regime had lost complete control of Baghdad, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz pointed to Syria, a country that borders both Israel and Iraq. He told Senators: "The Syrians are behaving badly." He added: "They need to be reminded that if they continue then we need to think about what our policy is with respect to a country that harbors terrorists, or harbors war criminals, or was in recent times shipping things to Iraq."**13**

The Bush doctrine and the use of American force against Iraq, however, do not alone explain the transatlantic and global fissures that have been deepening since September 11, 2001. We must consider other related causes as well. Foremost has been the so-called "power gap" between the U.S. and other nations, particularly European nations.

III. The Transatlantic "Power Gap"

The United States would not have been able to propound its National Security Strategy were it not for the fact that its military power became unsurpassed and unchallengeable. The United States had invested heavily in the development of new military technologies during the cold war—particularly during President Reagan's administration—many of which became operational after the demise of the Soviet Union. The United States remained a military and economic giant after the end of the cold war. It continued to develop new technologies providing its military with remarkable and exponential advances in communications, intelligence gathering, precision-guided munitions, and joint-strike operations.

Meanwhile, Europeans did the reverse--they allowed their military expenditures to decline. While the United States spent 3.3 percent of its gross domestic product on its armed forces in 2002, Germany's military spending was only 1.5 percent. Most NATO allies followed Germany's lead in allowing defense spending to decline after the cold war. As a result, America's annual defense budget is now nearly double that of the 18 other NATO countries combined.

The United States spent $322 billion on defense in 2001--more than the 11 next highest defense-spending nations in the world combined. Soon the U.S. spending is likely to surpass that of all other countries in the world combined.   Meanwhile, the American economy in 2002 showed real growth of 2.4 percent, while Germany's rate was 0.2 percent and France's economy was doing only slightly better. Over the last decade, the United States reportedly achieved nearly twice the growth of France and almost three times that of Germany. The result is a huge "power gap" or "capabilities gap" between the United States and Europe, so wide that it appears that Europe in the foreseeable future will lag far behind America. Indeed, most European leaders have little desire at present to increase military spending, with no obvious enemy threatening their security. Raising taxes, deficit financing, and cutting social programs in order to buy weapons are considered politically impossible. Their slowly growing economies seemingly cannot sustain larger military outlays.**14**

In his 2002 annual report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld described the global military posture of the United States to consist of "an enhanced forward deterrent posture."   This new national security strategy comprises, in Rumsfeld's words, "immediately employable forward stationed and deployed forces; globally available reconnaissance, strike, and command and control assets; information operations capabilities; and rapidly deployable, highly lethal and sustainable forces…." He explained: "Over time, this reoriented global posture will render forward forces capable of swiftly defeating an adversary's military and political objectives with only modest reinforcement."**15**

The worldview reflected by this national security strategy of the United States has provoked widespread opposition within Europe. The broad aversion among Europeans to the use of force in international relations derives from the devastating military conflicts they experienced on their continent during the two world wars of the last century. Germany and France, for example, suffered greatly during the first half of the 20th century. Now, after 50 years of integration replacing enmity of the past, Europeans have greater faith in cooperation and peaceful negotiation, whereas Americans have a greater disposition to use military force, as witness Donald Rumsfeld's report.**16**

Far from lamenting this division between Americans and Europeans, Robert Kagan, co-founder of the Project for the New American Century, seems to give implicit approval of this fundamental cleavage. He begins his widely-discussed recent book, *Of Paradise and Power*, with this provocative statement: "It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world." They differ on the all-important question of power. "That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand one another less and less." There are two main reasons, Kagan argues, why Europeans avoid the need for the use of force in international relations. One is that they are weak in military power, having depended on the American power umbrella, and are thus inclined toward an international system based on law. Second is their support of the European Union to assure peace through observance of binding international rules. "Just as there is little reason to expect Europe to change its fundamental course," Kagan concludes "there is little cause to believe the United States will change its own course, or begin to conduct itself in the world in a fundamentally different manner..…It is reasonable to assume that we have only just entered a long era of American hegemony."[17]

While acknowledging the importance of Kagan's argument about America's strength as distinguished from Europe's weakness, Kagan has aroused a number of critics who have a different worldview. In a December 2002 speech at Austria's Diplomatic Academy, U.S. Ambassador W. L. Lyons Brown described Kagan's thesis as "greatly exaggerated."[18] Likewise, Philip Gordon of the Brookings Institution has written that "it would be as wrong to exaggerate the gaps between Americans and Europeans as it would to ignore them."[19]

Charles Kupchan, who worked on European affairs during the Clinton administration, appears to agree that there is a transatlantic power gap by also acknowledging that the United States is in a position of unchallenged dominance. In his recent book, *The End of the American Era*, Kupchan writes: "America's military and its national economy are second to none; no other country even comes close. In combination with its seemingly unlimited capacity for technological innovation…these assets provide the United States an unprecedented level of global primacy." However, in

contrast to Kagan who argues that the power gap is here to stay, Kupchan contends that America's preponderance is destined to slip away, because of the rivalry arising from Europe's revolutionary political and economic integration, as well as its collective wealth, and the facts that Russia will ultimately rebound and take its place in an integrating Europe and that Asia is not far behind.**20**

The relative ease with which U.S.-led forces deposed the regime of Saddam Hussein in about three weeks time was a singular demonstration of the magnitude of American power. American forces lost only about half of those lost in the 1991 Gulf War. One military historian commented: "It is nearly impossible to recall a similar advance that has traveled so far, so fast, with so few losses. ....What happened during…three weeks is unprecedented in military history." He observed that the U.S. military "seems to be doubling, tripling, and even quadrupling its lethality every few years," at such a dizzying pace "that our sheer destructive power makes it hard to work with others in joint operations." And he added: "There quite literally has never been a single nation that has exercised such colossal military force to change almost instantly the status quo."**21**

In addition to the U.S.-led war against Iraq, the National Security Strategy of the United States, and the transatlantic power gap, there are many other dimensions of discord between America and Europe. A list could include differences regarding: language, culture, and the role of religion; leadership styles; education; trade policies; energy (especially oil); constitutional and political systems; the death penalty; genetically modified food; etc.   Professor Richard Pells, in his brilliant and penetrating book entitled *Not Like Us*, includes differences regarding: mass media, literature, entertainment, tourism, economics, nationalism, and globalization, among other topics.**22** The list could go on and on.

The remainder of this paper attempts selectively to distinguish and briefly discuss two major policy dimensions of transatlantic discord, namely: the transatlantic alliance, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

V. The Transatlantic Alliance

The war against Iraq did more than topple Saddam Hussein. It appeared to many to have put in jeopardy the future of the transatlantic alliance and the system of global alliances that had governed the world since World War II. As the war appeared to be imminent, a *New York Times* editorial commented: "The Atlantic alliance is now more deeply riven than any time since its creation more than half a century ago." Philip Gordon labeled the debate about Iraq as provoking "one of the worst transatlantic crises-- and one of the worst intra-European crises--of the entire post-World War II period." Even more pessimistic was Helena Cobban of *The Christian Science Monitor* who wrote that the war "threatens to unravel not just the 58-year-old UN system, but the whole web of interstate relations that has grown up through the past four centuries."[23]

In the months preceding September 11, 2001, the United States had seemingly turned away from a multilateralist approach and the concerns of its European allies, most notably by abandoning the Kyoto Protocol on global warming, refusing to sign the treaty establishing the International Criminal Court, and withdrawing from the Antiballistic Missile Treaty. On January 28, 2003, in his State of the Union Address, President Bush declared: "the course of this nation does not depend on the decisions of others."[24] In other words, the U.S. was not going to be constrained by its European allies in its intent to depose the regime of Saddam Hussein or the regimes of other rogue states. The U.S. and Britain did not need approval by the three other permanent members of the U.N. Security Council--France, Russia, and China--nor its close ally, Germany—all major world powers which strongly opposed the war against Iraq.

This U.S. posture was widely interpreted as meaning that the United States had opted for a unilateralist or "go-it-alone" approach in its international relations, a posture that would split if not doom the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the Western Alliance. In sharp contrast, European nations generally were viewed as being strongly influenced by the ravages of 20th century wars and, more recently, by the demise of a threatening Soviet Union and the end of the cold war. Accordingly, they opted for a multilateralist and integrationist approach to international relations marked by political and economic cooperation, diplomatic negotiation, and an aversion to war and hence the

peaceful resolution to problems. Michael F. Glennon has written: "Europeans see democratic legitimacy as flowing from the will of the international community. Thus they comfortably submit to impingements on their sovereignty that Americans would find anathema."**25**

It is suggested here that such distinctions are overdrawn. To distinguish the U.S. and European postures in such antithetical and opposing terms, of unilateralism versus multilateralism, permits no grey area and is at least overstated. The United States continues to be committed to multilateralist involvement in international relations, as for example its vital participation in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, its return to UNESCO, its substantially increased foreign aid spending, its payment of past arrears to the UN, and its insistence on a multilateralist dialogue with North Korea concerning its nuclear challenge.**26**

A major difference, according to a recent CSIS report, is that Europe is primarily Euro-centric in its vision, by placing its security interests and trust in international organizations, namely the United Nations, NATO, and the European Union, whereas the United States strategic vision has become much more global. "Where once that vision focused on the defense of Europe, making the transatlantic relationship central to U.S. strategic thinking and military planning, today European security is less central." This, then, is essentially a "vision gap."**27**

The greatest difference between contemporary Europe and the United States, however, may be Europe's aversion to war compared with the Bush doctrine of preemptive war. It appears that the United States may have embarked on a course akin to the early 19th century contention of Clausewitz that "War is merely the continuation of policy by other means."**28**   Perhaps even more pertinent to the strategic vision of the United States is the ancient Chinese essay by Sun Tsu, *The Art of War*, who advised: "He who excels in conquering his enemies triumphs before threats materialize."**29**

V. The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Some observers believe that the root cause of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the U.S. war on terrorism was Arab resentment of America's apparent partiality toward Israel. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "There is a nearly unanimous global consensus that the United States policy has become one-sided and morally hypocritical…."**30** Many Europeans have difficulty understanding how little Israel can exert such enormous influence over the world's sole superpower. And for their part, many Americans have difficulty understanding why continental Europeans are much more critical of Israel and generally more supportive of the Palestinian cause.

According to Rupert Cornwell, in his 2002 article published in the journal, *European Affairs*, American politicians and eminent columnists brand Europe as naïve at best, or "irredeemably anti-Semitic at worst," for its criticism of the recent Israeli crackdown against Palestinians in the West Bank. Cornwell contends that Europeans no longer view Israel as "an underdog" surrounded by threatening neighbors, but rather as "a mighty military power," possessing nuclear weapons, and "capable of annihilating the surrounding Arab states." Moreover, Cornwell argues, it is not the Israeli lobby that is dictating American foreign policy; rather it is Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, for whom Europeans have a particular dislike because of "his alleged complicity in the massacre of Palestinian refugees at Shabra and Chatila" during Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982. Finally, Cornwell claims that "the same collection of anti-Iraq hawks have become Israel's most vociferous champions" within the U.S. government.**31** Benjamin Gilman responded to Cornwell by claiming that Europeans who would deny Israel's right to defend itself "are unaware of the nature of the forces that Israel is forced to deal with."**32**

The taking of sides and the charges and countercharges concerning the collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process appear to have no end. There is little question that there has existed a rift between the United States and Europe over the Middle East since the 1940s, and that the current discord between the United States and Europe derives from Europe's perception of America's continuing preferential treatment of Israel. There are critics of U.S. relations with Israel who contend that highly placed Bush

administration officials were responsible for devising a new strategy for protecting Israel from neighboring Arab adversaries.

In 1996, Richard Perle, Douglas Feith and David Wurmser reportedly acted at the behest of then Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to co-author a strategy paper advocating the removal of Iraq's Saddam Hussein from power as a means both of containing Syria and as "an important Israeli objective in its own right." Shortly after Saddam Hussein was removed from power in April 2003, Netanyahu--now Sharon's finance minister and an avowed opponent of a Palestinian state—boasted to an Israeli newspaper: "It is in our power to affect American policy towards Israel and towards the Palestinians."**33** Currently, Richard Perle is the recently retired chairman of the Pentagon's Defense Policy Board; Douglas Feith is the Defense Department's undersecretary for policy—the department's third highest position; and David Wurmser is special assistant to John Bolton, the State Department's undersecretary for arms control.

Pro-Israel sympathizers within the Bush administration, and U.S. partiality toward Israel, however, may not be the phenomena that most drive European leaders to be sympathetic toward Palestinians while being critical of Israel. Perhaps more salient in explaining current differences between the United States and Europe concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are their different political constituencies, not to mention Europe's geographic proximity and closer historic and economic ties to Arab states.

Just as Jews are politically well organized and influential in the United States, Muslims have become a more vital force in the domestic politics of France, Britain and Germany. Muslims in France now make up 15 percent, or about 5 to 7 million of France's population, nearly half of whom are French citizens. The 15 million Muslims of the European Union comprise three times the number of Muslims living in the United States, whereas approximately 5.2 million or 40 percent of the world's 12.9 million Jews live in the U.S. Although Europe's Muslims are from different countries and display diverse religious tendencies, they share sympathy for Palestine and Palestinians. The presence of nearly 10 million Muslims compared with only 700,000 Jews in France and Germany alone helps explain why continental Europe has a perspective regarding the Middle East that is different from that of the United States. Europe's Muslims have

become politically organized and a powerful political force that exacerbates existing strains within the transatlantic relationship.**34**

Regardless of transatlantic strains relating to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, overlooked is the fact that, in his June 24, 2002 address, President George W. Bush became the first U.S. president to call for the creation of a Palestinian state.**35** It is important to note here that this U.S. initiative led to a peace plan devised by the U.S., European Union, the United Nations and Russia, known as "the road map" aimed at establishing a Palestinian state in three years. It is also important to note, however, that although Israeli Prime Minister Sharon has said he embraces the road map as a concept, his aides raised many Israeli objections. Among these objections is the potential role of the European Union, Russia and the United Nations Security Council in monitoring compliance with the peace plan.   Israel has made known that it does not trust these parties to look after its interest.**36**

VI. Conclusion

"To compare," according to the dictionary, is to discover the similarities and dissimilarities of two or more subjects. The foregoing analysis focuses on the dissimilarities or differences between Europe and the United States. We should be equally mindful, however, of the commonalities that bind Europeans and Americans together as allies.

Although U.S. Senator Mike Mansfield was an Asian expert, who was destined to become U.S. ambassador to Japan, he nevertheless said—in a 1969 lecture—that "We have been an Atlantic-minded nation and understandably so." He explained: "Most of us follow religions of trans-Atlantic origin. The languages that are learned in our schools are primarily those of the nations across the Atlantic. Americans who travel abroad usually begin their journeys by crossing the Atlantic." And he added: "Fashions, architecture, routines of living in this nation all show strong influences from the opposite side of the ocean. We are, in short, preponderantly 'Atlantic' by heredity, tradition, and proclivity."**37**

This theme has been reiterated by Karsten D. Voigt of the German Foreign Office, who observed that "Europe and America share a common cultural and intellectual history; ….they both have a common bedrock of values and have a very similar understanding of representative democracy, human rights, the rule of law, and a free market economy." And he added: "Their cultural affinity persists."**38**

In short, more seems to unite America and its allies than divide them. In a TV interview in the Czech Republic on November 21, 2002, President Bush said: "We share common values…of freedom, individual rights and democracy."**39**   Supporting the president's view was a December 2002 publication of a Pew Research Center poll of national attitudes in 44 countries. The poll showed 61 percent of Germans, 63 percent of the French and 75 percent of Britons had a favorable view of the United States, which was the case with majorities in 35 of 42 countries where this question was asked. Although subsequent polls showed that America's image had slipped somewhat over the Iraq war, the reservoir of good will remains fairly deep.**40**

Not only are the European Union and North America the two most economically interconnected regions in the world, but the transatlantic partnership, according to U.S. Ambassador to Austria, W.L. Lyons Brown, also "has proved to be the most successful alliance ever known over two generations of shared endeavors and sacrifices."**41**

In conclusion, it is important to be reminded that the transatlantic alliance is neither dying nor split widely apart, and that the United States--in business, trade, science, academia, and general security matters--continues to work and consult closely with the European Union. America's most important partnership in the world remains with Europe.

NOTES

1   See: The Iraq Liberation Act, Public Law 105-338, October 31, 1998; and *Justice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper* (New York: Human Rights Watch, December 2002).

2   See, e.g.: *America's Image Further Erodes* (Washington, DC: The Pew Research Center, March 18, 2003); and Alan Cowell, "A Worried World Shows Discord," *The New York Times*, March 19, 2003, A1.

3   "Statement of Principles," *Project for the New American Century*, (Washington, DC: June 3, 1997).

4   See PNAC's copy of this January 26, 1998 letter to President Clinton, at (www.newamericancentury.org/iraqclintonletter.htm).

5   See PNAC's copy of this September 18, 1998 "Statement before the House National Security Committee," at (www.newamericancentury.org/iraqsep1898.htm).

6   Speech by President George W. Bush at Washington DC, September 14, 2001.

7   "You are either with us or against us," November 6, 2001, at (www.CNN.com).

8   See, e.g., Editorial, "Divisive Diplomacy With Europe," *The New York Times*, February 11, 2003, A26.

9   *The President's State of the Union Address* (Washington, DC: The White House, January 29, 2002).

10   Speech by President George W. Bush at West Point, New York, June 1, 2002.

11   *The National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, DC: The White House, September 2002).

12   See, e.g., Editorial, "War in the Ruins of Diplomacy," *The New York Times*, March 18, 2003, A30.

13 See: Phillip Pullella, "U.S. Tells Iran, Syria, N. Korea 'Learn from Iraq,'" *Yahoo! News*, April 9, 2003; and Matt Kelley, "Pentagon: No Major Iraqi Forces Remain," *Yahoo! News*, April 11, 2003. See, also: Susan Page, "War May Realign World and Define A Presidency," *USA Today*, March 17, 2003; and David E. Sanger, "A New Doctrine for War," *The New York Times*, March 18, 2003, A1, A10; John Feffer, "*Is North Korea Next?,"* (Silver City, NM & Washington, D.C.: Foreign Policy in Focus, March 24, 2003); and Paul Krugman, "Things to Come," *The New York Times*, March 18, 2002, A31.

14 See, e.g.: Craig S. Smith, "Germany's Military Sinking to 'Basket Case' Status," *The New York Times*, March 18, 2003, A3; Fareed Zakaria, "Why America Scares the World," *Newsweek*, March 24, 2003, 26; ""Still Sclerotic, After All These Years: Why Is Europe Growing So Slowly?" *The Economist*, March 13, 2003; and Floyd Norris, "That Other Problem with 'Old Europe,'" *The New York Times*, January 31, 2003, C1. The overall employment rate in the working-age population in the EU is 64% compared to 73% in the U.S., "Revitalizing Old Europe," *The Economist*, March 13, 2003.

15 Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 2002* (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2002), 21.

16 See, e.g., Philip H. Gordon, *The Crisis in the Alliance* (Washington, DC: Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution, February 24, 2003), 3-4.

17 Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 1, 37, 88.

18 W.L. Lyons Brown, "Conflicts and Resolutions: The Need for Leadership," U.S. Embassy Vienna, Austria, December 3, 2002.

19 Philip H. Gordon, "Bridging the Atlantic Divide," *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 82, No. 1, January/February 2003, 72.

20 Charles A. Kupchan, *The End of the American Era: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Geopolitics of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2002), xiv-xvi.

21 See: Victor Davis Hanson, "The Ironies of War: What We Have Witnessed is Unprecedented in Military History," *National Review Online* , April 11, 2003; and his "Anatomy of the Three-Week War," *ibid.*, April 17, 2003, at (www.nationalreview.com).

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